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Clarifying the Peculiar Risk Doctrine:
The Rule Restated
Generally, employers' of independent contractors 2 are not held

vicariously liable for the torts committed by independent contractors
during the course of the work. 3 This doctrine is commonly referred
to as the rule of nonliability. 4 The rationale for the rule of nonliability

is that an employer who has no right to exercise control over the
manner or method of the performance by an independent contractor

should not be held vicariously liable for injuries that result from
negligent performance by such a contractor.5

Over time this general rule has been severely eroded by a large
number of exceptions. These exceptions have virtually sWallowed the

rule. 6 California has specifically recognized that the nonliability rule
7
is more of an exception than the general rule.

I. See generally CAL. LABOR CODE § 3300 (West 1987) (definition of employer). The
term 'employer" is used herein to define the status of a person or entity hiring the services
of an independent contractor, and is not used to denote the existence of an employer/employee
relationship.
2. See generally id. § 3353; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1959) (defining
"independent contractor").
3. See generally RESTATEiMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965); W. KEETON, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 509 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]; 4 B.
WITKIN. SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW §§ 661-662 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984); 38 Cal. Jur.
3d Independent Contractors §§ 13-23 (1977 & Supp. 1987) (stating the general rule of nonliability
for the torts of independent contractors and the various exceptions to that rule).
4. See Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 508, 595 P.2d 619, 621-22,
156 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43-44 (1979) (stating the California Supreme Court's most recent treatment
of the nonliability rule and peculiar risk doctrine).
5. RESTATEM.ENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 409 comment b (1965); PROSSER, supra note 3, §
71; 38 Cal. Jur. 3d Independent Contractors § 13 (1977 & Supp. 1987).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410-429 (listing 24 such exceptions including,
for example, negligent direction by the employer (§ 410), negligent selection of the contractor
(k 411), negligent inspection of work completed by the contractor (§ 412), work done in a
public place (§ 417), statutory nondelegable duties (§ 424), .and the peculiar risk doctrine (§§
413. 416. 426, and 427)); See also PROSSER, supra note 3, § 71, at 509; 4 B. WITIKN, supra
note 3, §§ 661-662; 38 Cal. Jur. 3d Independent Contractors § 13 (various sources recognizing
the erosion of the general rule of nonliability). See generally Comment, Responsibilityfor the
Torts of an Independent Contractor,39 YALE L.J. 861 (1930) (discussing the range of exceptions
to the nonliability rule).
7. Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 252, 437 P.2d 508, 513, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20,
25 (1968). The court cites the language from Restatement (Second) of Torts section 409
comment b that the exceptions "are so numerous, and they have so far eroded the 'general
rule,' that it can now be said to be 'general' only in the sense that it is applied where no
good reason is found for departing from it." Id.
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Among the exceptions to the rule of nonliability is the peculiar
risk doctrine.8 The peculiar risk doctrine imposes liability on the
employer of an independent contractor when a plaintiff's injury
arises out of a peculiar risk inherent in the contract work, against
which a reasonable employer would have taken special precautions. 9
The doctrine consists of three prima facie elements that focus on the
character of the risk of harm that caused the injury.' 0 First, the risk
must be inherent in the work." Second, the risk must be beyond the
2
mere common or ordinary risks associated with the contract work.'
Third, the risk must be foreseeable to a reasonable employer. 3
Despite the simplicity of this statement of the peculiar risk doctrine,
application of the doctrine has produced problems in California. 4
Two important factors contribute to the confusion surrounding the
peculiar risk doctrine. First, the California Supreme Court adopted
the peculiar risk doctrine as codified in the second Restatement of
Torts. 5 The second Restatement of Torts has promulgated duplicative
statements of the doctrine that are difficult to distinguish and apply. 6
Second, the California courts have not agreed on a single analysis

8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413, 416, and 427 (1965). See also Aceves
v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 509, 595 P.2d 619, 622, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44
(1979). The California Supreme Court stated in Aceves that the term "special risk" is perhaps
a more descriptive label for the doctrine, but none of the subsequent court of appeal opinions
have abandoned the peculiar risk label utilized in the restatement. Id. at 509 n.2, 595 P.2d at
, 156 Cal. Rptr. at
. See generally Comment, A Systematic Approach to the Peculiar
Risk Exception to the Independent Contractor'sRule in Iowa, 67 IOWA L. REV. 589 (1982)
(discussing the application of the peculiar risk doctrine under Iowa law).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413, 416, and 427 (1965). 4 B. WITKIN, supra
note 3, §§ 661-662.

10. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 413 comment b (1965).

11. Id. (stating that the risk must arise out of the "character" of the work or "the place
where it is to be done.").
12. Id. (stating that the risk must be "special" and call for the taking of special
precautions).
13. Id. §§ 416 comment e, 427 comment b (1965) (stating that the risk must be one
"which the employer should recognize as likely to arise," or one "recognizable in advance").
14. See, e.g., Stark v. Weeks Real Estate, 94 Cal. App. 3d 965, 970, 156 Cal. Rptr. 701,
704 (1979) (stating that the "abstract definition of the doctrine is elusive"); Henderson Bros.
Stores, Inc. v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 916, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875, 881 (1981) (noting that
"courts have taken varying approaches to deciding" what risks are within the peculiar risk
doctrine); LaCount v. Hensel Phelps Const. Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 754, 764, 145 Cal. Rptr.
244, 249 (1978) (noting that the term "peculiar risk" is not defined well by the Restatement).
15. See, e.g., Caudel v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 165 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8-9 n.4, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 222, 227 n.4 (1985) (indicating that some of the Restatement terminology has tended to
"engender confusion"). See infra notes 39-83 and accompanying text (discussing the full
development and acceptance of the second Restatement formulation of the peculiar risk doctrine
in California),
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413, 416, 426 and 427 (1965); infra notes
47-83 and accompanying text (analyzing and construing these Restatement sections).
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for applying the doctrine.

7

Rather, several districts of the California

Court of Appeal have applied distinguishable approaches in defining
and applying the peculiar risk doctrine.

8

Thus, the method of deter-

mining which risks are sufficiently peculiar to justify imposing vicarious liability on the employer is varied. The lack of a single

concise definition of the peculiar risk doctrine, coupled with varying
approaches to the application of the doctrine, has created substantial

difficulty in litigating cases with a peculiar risk issue. 9
The purpose of this comment is to clarify the peculiar risk doctrine
as applied in California. Part I will focus on the general scope of

the doctrine and on the policy considerations that underlie the
application of the doctrine. 2° Part II will trace the development of

the peculiar risk doctrine in California. 2' Part III will explain and
construe the Restatement formulation of the doctrine. 22 Part IV of
the comment will examine the recent cases that reveal the varying
approaches taken in applying the doctrine. 23 Finally, part V will
suggest a simplified analytical approach to the application of the

peculiar risk doctrine. 24
I.

THE SCOPE AND POLICY OF THE PECULIAR RISK DOCTRINE

25
The peculiar risk doctrine is essentially a rule of vicarious liability.
When the peculiar risk doctrine applies, liability for an injury re-

17. See, e.g., Henderson Bros., 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 916, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875, 881
(noting that varying approaches have been taken in applying the peculiar risk doctrine).
18. See infra notes 90-141 and accompanying text (discussing the several approaches to
the application of the doctrine). The first approach discussed in this comment is the attempt
by a court to define the scope of the peculiar risk doctrine by citing numerous factual examples
from previous decisions in which the doctrine was held to apply. The second approach was a
multifactor analysis that was articulated in Henderson Bros. The last distinguishable approach
discussed herein is a two-pronged analysis that was described in Jimenez v. Pacific Western
Construction Co. 185 Cal. App. 3d 102, 229 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1986).
19. See, e.g., Henderson Bros., 120 Cal. App. 3d at 912, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 879 (noting
that the trial judge misapprehended the scope of the doctrine).
20. See infra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 51-84 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 85-149 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 150-62 and accompanying text.
25. See generally PROSSER, supra note 3, 69, (5th ed. 1984) (providing general definition
of vicarious liability); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 416-429 (1965). The introductory
note to sections 416-429 describes these sections as "rules of vicarious liability." Section 416,
for example, imposes liability on the employer despite the lack of any active negligence on
the part of the employer. The employer's liability is based on the negligent acts of the
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sulting from the negligence of an independent contractor is imputed
to the employer. 26 In this sense, the peculiar risk doctrine functions

as an exception to the rule of nonliability. 27
The rationale for imposing vicarious liability is primarily based on

concerns of fundamental fairness and efficient loss allocation. 2 The
operation of the peculiar risk doctrine prevents employers from
insulating themselves from liability for harm resulting from risks they
have helped to create. 29 The doctrine is triggered when an employer

retains an independent contractor to perform work that involves
some foreseeable peculiar or special risk.30 When such peculiar or
special risks are present in contract work, public policy prevents
employers from shielding themselves from liability by delegating the

work to independent contractors. To allow employers this insulation
would be fundamentally unfair. 3' This unfairness arises first from
the fact that the employer is exercising full control over the choice
of an independent contractor.3 2 In exercising this choice, the employer
is in a position to choose a contractor who is both skilled and
financially responsible.3 3 Further, the employer generally has suffi-

cient bargaining power to extract express contractual indemnity from
the contractor.3 4 The employer is also in the best position to ensure
independent contractor. Id.
The peculiar risk doctrine is virtually indistinguishable in form and result from a nondelegable
duty. See Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 447, 445 P.2d 513, 516, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900
(1968) (listing the peculiar risk doctrine as one of a variety of nondelegable duties).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 comment a, comment c (1965) (stating that
the employer cannot shift to the contractor the responsibility for peculiar risks arising in the
work, and is liable irrespective of having made express provisions in the contract for special
precautions).
27. See, e.g., Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 508, 595 P.2d 619, 621,
156 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43-44 (1979) (stating that the peculiar risk doctrine is a "well-recognized
exception" to the rule of nonliability).
28. Id. at 508, 595 P.2d at 622, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 44 (citing Van Arsdale v. Hollinger,
68 Cal. 2d 245, 253, 437 P.2d 508, 513, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25 (1968) and Widman v. Rossmoor
Sanitation, Inc., 19 Cal. App. 3d 734, 747, 97 Cal. Rptr. 52, 59 (1971)).
29. See Schmidlin v. Alta Planning Mill Co., 170 Cal. 589, 592, 150 P. 983, 984 (1915)
(stating that when there is inherent danger in the work "it is not in consonance with justice

that responsibility for injury" be passed to the contractor);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs

§ 416 comment a (1965) (stating that employers cannot shift to contractors the responsibilities
for peculiar risks); See also id. § 427A comment b (noting a similar policy in the context of
independent contractors hired to perform abnormally dangerous activities; in such cases the
employers may not escape liability for dangers they have "set in motion").
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 comment d (1965) (stating that work must
involve some "special hazard").
31. See supra note 24 (discussing the policy considerations that underlie the peculiar risk
doctrine).
32. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 71, at 509.
33. Id.
34. Id.

200
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that adequate precautions are taken to protect against any special
risks. - Finally, the employer can efficiently distribute any resulting
loss through the cost of doing business.

II.

6

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE IN CAIFORNIA.

The California Supreme Court first recognized a form of the
peculiar risk doctrine in the case of Schmidlin v. Alta Planning Mill
Company." In Schmidlin, a bucket of paint, which had been placed
unsecured on a platform that was being lifted up the side of a
building, fell and struck the plaintiff. 8 The painters were hired as
independent contractors to paint a large sign on the side of the
employer's building. 9 The plaintiff argued that the building owner
should be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the painters.
The court recognized an exception to the nonliability rule when an
injury results from a risk inherent in the work being performed by
the independent contractor. 40 The application of the exception by the
court, however, was quite narrow. According to the court, the remote

35. Id.
36. Id. See also Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 508, 595 P.2d 619,
621, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43-44 (1979) (citing the same considerations as underlying the peculiar
risk doctrine).
When the referenced policy considerations are not applicable, the doctrine simply does not
apply. See, e.g., Addison v. Susanville Lumber, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 394, 120 Cal. Rptr.
737 (1975). In Addison the court found that the risk that an independent contractor would
require an inexperienced employee to fall a large tree was not a risk against which the employer
n ould reasonably be expected to take special precautions. Id. at 402, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
The court noted that imposing liability based on an unforeseeable risk would place too severe
a burden on the employer of the independent contractor. Id. See infra notes 122-28 and
accompanying text (discussing Addison). See also Elder v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 66 Cal.
App. 3d 650, 136 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1977). In Elder the plaintiff worked for an independent
contractor who had been hired to perform demolition work on the employer's building. The
court held that the risk created by the plaintiff's unforeseeable deviation from the planned
method of performing the work was not a risk inherent in the work, and thus the peculiar
risk doctrine was held inapplicable. Id. at 660, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 208. The court noted that
when the risk is not inherent in the work, the policy consideration behind the peculiar risk
doctrine make it inappropriate to shift the blame to the employer. Id.
37. 170 Cal. 589, 150 P. 983 (1915). In recognizing a peculiar risk type of exception to
the nonliability rule, the Schmidlin court relied upon cases which had found related reasons
to depart from the nonliability rule. See, e.g., Williams v. Fresno Coral & Irrigation Co., 96
Cal. 14, 30 P. 961 (1892) (the work delegated to the indepejndent contractor expressly required
and intended damage to the plaintiff's property); Kirk v. Santa Barbara Ice Co., 157 Cal.
591, 108 P. 509 (1910) (wherein the employer delegated the duty to restore a public sidewalk
that he had been licensed by the city to excavate).
38. Schmidlin, 170 Cal. at 590, 150 P. at 984.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 592, 150 P. at 984. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 (1965)
(using language of "inherent" risk in defining the peculiar risk doctrine).
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possibility that an unsecured bucket of paint on the platform might
fall was not a risk inherent in the work. 41 Rather, the court viewed

the risk of gross negligence by the contractor as collateral to the
risks inherent in the work being performed, and thus the employer

42
was not held vicariously liable.
Prior to the promulgation of the first Restatement of Torts, the

exception to the nonliability rule announced in the Schmidlin decision
was not altered or expanded. The first Restatement of Torts devoted
an entire chapter to codifying the primary exceptions to the nonlia-

bility rule, 43 one exception being the peculiar risk doctrine.4 4 Several
California courts referred in dicta to this Restatement chapter as a
correct statement of the primary common law exceptions to the
nonliability rule. 45 Shortly thereafter, in Courtell v. McEachen,46 the
California Supreme Court cited sections 413 and 416 of the first
Restatement as correct statements of the peculiar risk doctrine. 47 The
holding in Courtell was later relied upon in Van Arsdale v. Hollinger8

when the court adopted the second Restatement formulation of the
peculiar risk doctrine. 49 Thereafter, California courts utilized the

second Restatement definitions50 as correct statements of the peculiar
risk doctrine.

41. Schmidlin, 170 Cal. at 592, 150 P. at 984. In applying the exception the court required
that there be a close nexus between the particular negligent act and the existence of the inherent
risk that justifies departing from the nonliability rule. Id.
42. Id. Under a modern application of the peculiar risk doctrine, the outcome of Schmidlin
would have been different. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 427 comment c (1965).
Comment c contains an example that uses the facts of the Schmidlin case to illustrate a risk
that is squarely within the scope of the doctrine. Id.
Prior to the adoption by California of the first Restatement of Torts the doctrine was
generally referred to as the "intrinsically dangerous work" exception. See, e.g., Snyder v.
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 797, 285 P.2d 912, 916 (1955). One section of the
second Restatement formulation has retained this language. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 427 (1965). See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing § 427 in detail).
43. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 409-429 (1934). These sections make up a chapter
entitled "Employer Liability." Section 409 states the general rule of nonliability for the torts
of independent contractors. The remaining sections codify the primary common law exceptions
to the nonliability rule. See id. §§ 410-429.
44. See id. §§ 413, 416, 426 and 427. See also infra notes 52-69 and accompanying text
(discussing the Restatement formulation of the peculiar risk doctrine in full).
45. See, e.g., Potter v. Empress Theatre Co., 91 Cal. App. 2d 4, 10-11, 204 P.2d 120,
124 (1949) (citing Restatement §§ 413 and 416 as potential grounds for imposing liability on
the employer); Knell v. Morris, 39 Cal. 2d 450, 456, 247 P.2d 352, 355 (1952) (citing Restatement
§§ 410-429 as codifying the numerous exceptions to the nonliability rule).
46. 51 Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959).
47. Courtell, 51 Cal. 2d at 456-57, 334 P.2d at 874.
48. 68 Cal. 2d 245, 437 P.2d 508, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1968).
49. Van Arsdale, 68 Cal. 2d at 253-54, 437 P.2d at 513-14, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26 (noting
that only minor, inconsequential changes were made in the second Restatement sections stating
the peculiar risk doctrine).
50. See notes 51-84 and accompanying text (discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts
sections 413, 416, 426 and 427).
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III.

THE RESTATEMENT FORMULATION

Four independent sections of the second Restatement of Torts are
relevant to the peculiar risk doctrine, specifically sections 413, 416,
426, and 427.1' These sections can be divided into two classes based
upon their approach to the peculiar risk doctrine. The first class
includes sections 413, 416, and 427.52 These sections provide affirmative statements of the elements and parameters of the peculiar
risk doctrine. The second class consists of section 426.- 3 Section 426
is labelled the collateral risk doctrine. The collateral risk doctrine
54
defines risks that fall outside the scope of the peculiar risk doctrine.
A.

The PeculiarRisk Doctrine

California courts most often use section 416 as an affirmative
definition of the peculiar risk doctrine.55 Section 416 imposes liability
on the employer when harm results from the failure of the independent contractor to take special precautions against a foreseeable
peculiar risk.5 6 Liability is imposed even though the employer has
provided for special precautions against the risk.-7

51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413, 416, 426 and 427 (1965). These sections are
included in Restatement Chapter 15 entitled, "Liability of an Employer of an Independent
Contractor."
52. Id. § 413, 416, 427 (1965). While these are generally treated as a class, section 416 is
utilized more frequently by the California courts to state the definition of the peculiar risk
doctrine in California.
53. Id. § 426 (1965).
54. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text (fully construing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 426). The collateral risk doctrine is essentially a negative statement of the peculiar
risk doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 426 comment a. Compare id. §§ 413,
416, 427 (stating the peculiar risk doctrine) with id. § 426 (stating the collateral risk doctrine).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965) provides:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should
recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to
others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm
caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take
such precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in
the contract or otherwise.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The fact that liability is imposed regardless of whether the employer made
provisions for special precautions reveals that the drafters of the Restatement were using the
language of "special precaution" in order to limit the doctrine to special or peculiar risks.
That is, the doctrine does not include risks against which a reasonable person would only take
ordinary precautions. The "special precautions" language embodies the prima facia requirement
that the risk be beyond the common or ordinary risks inherent in the work. Id.
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Section 413 is another statement of the same basic doctrine.55 Both
sections 413 and 416 contain the prima facie requirements of the
peculiar risk doctrine.5 9 Section 413, however, is designed to apply
only when the employer has completely failed to make provisions,
either in the contract or otherwise, for the taking of special precautions against a peculiar risk. 6° In such circumstances, the employer
is held directly liable for physical harm caused by the absence of
special precautions. 61 The California courts have recognized that
liability under section 416 is vicarious,6 2 while, in contrast, section
413 imposes direct liability against the employer. 61 Section 416 is
designed to apply only when the employer has expressly provided for
special precautions against the peculiar risk. 64 If no such provisions
have been made, section 413 should be applied, and the employer is
6
held directly liable for harm resulting from the peculiar risky.
According to comment c to section 416, however, applying either section

58. Id. § 413 provides:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should
recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of
physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer
(a)fails to provide in the contract that the contractorshall take such precautions,
or (b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the
taking of special precautions.
Id. (emphasis added to highlight language in § 413 which differs from § 416).
59. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. The three prima facie elements of the
peculiar risk doctrine are: (1) The risk must arise from or be inherent in the work, (2) the
risk must be beyond the mere common or ordinary risks involved in the work, and (3) thc
risk must be one which is foreseeable to a reasonable person in the employer's position. Id.
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 comments a, b (1965); id. § 416 comment
b (1965) (stating that when provisions for special precautions have been made by the employer,
the employer may nonetheless be held liable under section 416).
61. Id. § 413.
62. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1404 (5th ed. 1979) (defining vicarious liability as "indirect
legal responsibility").
63. Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 509, 595 P.2d 619, 622, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 41, 44 (1979). While the Aceves court expressly distinguished between direct liability
under § 413 and vicarious liability under § 416, a number of lower courts have not made the
distinction. Id. The courts apparently choose to rely upon the more inclusive statement
contained in § 416. See, e.g., Caudel v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 165 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6,
211 Cal. Rptr. 222, 224 (1985) (noting the distinction between these sections in footnote 2,
but proceeding to apply section 416 without citing any facts indicating that the employer had
made any provision for taking special precautions).
The distinction clearly suggests a required threshold question of whether the employer made
provisions for special precautions in order to determine which section should be applied. No
reported cases have entered into such an analysis, however.
64. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 416 comment c (1965). The language in section
416 indicating that the employer will be liable "even though" provisions have been made in
the contract or otherwise for taking special precautions against the peculiar risk implies that
such provisions have in fact been made. Id.
65. Id. 99 413 comment a, 416 comment c.
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will have no impact on the liability of the employer. 66 Thus, when

the prima facie elements of the doctrine are satisfied, the application
of one section rather than the other will not change the outcome.
Section 427 is the final affirmative statement of the peculiar risk
doctrine in the second Restatement formulation. 67 While section 427

differs in form from section 416, the comments to both sections
make clear that the sections are closely related and essentially dupli-

cative statements of the peculiar risk doctrine. 6s According to the
comments, courts that utilize language of "inherent or intrinsic
danger" to describe the doctrine, rather than "peculiar or special
risk" should apply section 427.69 Section 427 is often mentioned in
appellate court decisions as stating essentially the same rule as section
416,70 however, the courts generally utilize section 413 and 416 to
define the peculiar risk doctrine. 7' Regardless of which section is

used, the resulting liability will be the same. No reported cases have
articulated a rationale or justification for these redundant statements
of the doctrine. Thus, it appears that while a single statement of the

Id. § 416 comment c. Comment c provides:
[T]he fact that the contract contains express stipulations for the taking of adequate
precautions and that the contractor agrees to assume all liability for harm caused
by his failure to do so, does not relieve his employer from the liability stated in this
Section.

66.

Id.
67. Id. § 427. Section 427 provides:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger
to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or
normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when
making the contract, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others
by the contractor's failure to take reasonable precautions against such dangers.
Id.
68. Id. § 427 comment a. Section 427 comment a provides: "The rule stated in this
Section is closely related to, and to a considerable extent a duplication of, that stated in §
416, as to work likely to create a peculiar risk of harm to others unless special precautions
are taken." Id. See also id. § 416 comment a. Section 416 comment a provides:
There is a close relation between the rule stated in this Section, and that stated in
§ 427, as to dangers inherent in or normal to the work. The two rules represent
The rules stated in the
different forms of statement of the same general rule ....
two Sections have been applied more or less interchangeably in the same types of
cases, and frequently have been stated in the same opinion as the same rule ...
Id.
69. Id. § 427 comments b, c. See also supra note 42 (discussing the Schmidlin case, which
employed language similar to § 427, and discussing the fact that the outcome of Schmidlin
would apparently be different under an application of § 427).
70. See, e.g., Caudel v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 165 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6, 211 Cal. Rptr.
222, 225 (1985).
71. See, e.g., Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 508-09, 595 P.2d 619,
622, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44 (1979) (holding that the "applicable law on the peculiar risk
doctrines is stated in sections 413 and 416 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts").
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doctrine would have been sufficient, the second Restatement of Torts
provided three.
B.

The CollateralRisk Doctrine

Section 426 of the second Restatement outlines the collateral risk
doctrine. 72 The collateral risk doctrine is the converse of the peculiar
risk doctrine. 73 The collateral risk doctrine defines risks that fall
outside the scope of the peculiar risk doctrine and thus do not
support an exception to the nonliability rule.7 4 The focus of collateral
risk analysis is on the specific negligent conduct of the independent
contractor that causes an injury. 75 Under the collateral risk doctrine,
an employer is not held vicariously liable when the negligence of the
independent contractor results from performance of the contract work
in an unforeseeable manner. 76 The second Restatement illustration of
a collateral risk is a situation in which the employer hires a contractor
to make an excavation. 77 The employer may reasonably expect the
contractor to use a bulldozer, or picks and shovels. However, when
the contractor instead uses explosives and causes physical harm, a
collateral risk issue is raised. 78 Under the collateral risk doctrine the
employer is not liable for injuries that result from the contractor's
negligent use of this unusual method, so long as the employer had
no reason to anticipate that the contractor might use such a method
79
of performance.

72. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 426 (1965). Section 426 provides:
Except as stated in [sections] 428 and 429, an employer of an independent contractor,
unless he is himself negligent, is not liable for physical harm caused by any negligence
of the contractor if (a) the contractor's negligence consists solely in the improper
manner in which he does the work, and (b) it creates a risk of such harm which is
not inherent in or normal to the work, and (c) the employer had no reason to
contemplate the contractor's negligence when the contract was made.
Id.
73. Id. § 427 comment d. Comment d provides: "The rule stated in § 426 is the converse
of the rule stated here, and the two should be read together." Id.
74. Id. § 426 comment a.
75. Id.
76. Id. Using the language of comment a to § 426, a risk arising from the unforeseeable
manner of performance by the independent contractor would be referred to as "abnormal or
unusual" negligence that is outside the risks inherent in the work. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. See also PROSSER, supra note 3 § 71, at 516. Prosser defines collateral risks as
those risks having a "disassociation from any inherent or contemplated special risk which may
be expected to be created by the work." Id.
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When the above hypothetical is analyzed under an affirmative
statement of the peculiar risk doctrine, rather than under the collat-

eral risk doctrine, the same result is obtained. In terms used by
section 416, for example, the risk that the independent contractor

would use explosives for the excavation is not the type of risk that
the employer "should recognize" as arising from the contract work.

0

Consequently, the requirements of the peculiar risk doctrine would
not be satisfied, and the employer would not be held liable for the
negligence of the independent contractor. Thus, whether a fact sit-

uation is analyzed under an affirmative statement of the peculiar risk
doctrine, or under the collateral risk doctrine, the same result is
8
obtained. '

A thorough examination of the four sections of the second Restatement of Torts relevant to the peculiar risk doctrine reveals
substantial redundancies. First, to distinguish among the affirmative

definitions of the peculiar risk doctrine will not produce differing
results.12 In addition, the inclusion of a section codifying the collateral

risk doctrine serves only to require an additional layer of analysis. 83

As a result, courts are compelled to distinguish among the sections,
and include an unnecessary discussion of the collateral risk doctrine.

Admittedly, the structure of the peculiar risk doctrine in the second
Restatement will not lead to incorrect results. Nevertheless, the multihas added to the difficulty in
section treatment of the Restatement
84
defining this elusive doctrine.

80. Likewise, using the language of section 427, the work could not be said to "involv[e]
a special danger to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in
or normal to the work." Id. § 427.
81. Comment a to § 426 states that the collateral risk doctrine protects the employer from
liability for negligence by the independent contractor in the "operative details" of the contract
work. Id. § 462 comment a. This would include such items as negligence in driving a standard
pickup truck on the work site. This type of risk would likewise be excluded from the scope
of the peculiar risk doctrine as being a common or ordinary risk, not calling for any special
precautions. Again, section 426 is redundant in covering these situations. See id. § 413 comment
b.
In seeming recognition that the collateral risk doctrine is redundant, California BAJI does
not contain an instruction on the collateral risk doctrine. See California Book of Approved
Jury Instructions, BAJI 13.21 & 13.21.4 (7th ed. 1986).
82. See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text (discussing Restatement (Second) of
Torts sections 413, 416, and 427).
83. See, e.g., Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 595 P.2d 619, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 41 (1979); Henderson Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 174 Cal. Rptr.
875 (1981). Virtually all of the reported decisions on the peculiar risk doctrine include a
separate discussion and analysis on the collateral risk doctrine, after deciding on the peculiar
risk doctrine issue. Several courts have, however, recognized that the collateral risk doctrine,
by its own definition is inapplicable in cases which have been found to present a peculiar risk.
See White v. Uniroyal, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d 1, 31, 202 Cal. Rptr. 141, 159 (1984).
84. See Caudel v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 165 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8-9 n.4, 211 Cal. Rptr.
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IV.

APPLICATION OF THE PECULIAR RISK DOCTRINE IN CALIFORNIA.

After the promulgation of the second Restatement of Torts, the

California courts tacitly accepted the Restatement version of the
peculiar risk doctrine without critical interpretation. 5 The most recent
supreme court case to analyze the doctrine is Aceves v. Regal Pale
Brewing Co. 8 6 In Aceves, the court cited and applied sections 413,
416, and 426 of the second Restatement. The Aceves court did not

attempt to distinguish among the Restatement sections beyond noting
that Section 413 imposes direct liability, while section 416 imposes

vicarious liability. 81In discussing section 426, the court cited Professor

Prosser's definition of collateral risks as those risks that are "foreign" to the normal, inherent risks which trigger the peculiar risk
doctrine. 89 The Aceves court, however, failed to articulate a broadly
applicable analytical approach to determine when the peculiar risk
doctrine should apply. Consequently, the lower courts have no clear
guidance on how the doctrine should be applied. The absence of

clear guidance from the California Supreme Court has led to the
development of at least three distinguishable approaches to the ap-

plication of the peculiar risk doctrine in the appellate courts. 90
The first approach originated in the case of Griesel v. Dart

Industries, Inc.91 In Griesel, an employee of the independent con-

222, 227 n.4 (1985) (indicating that some of the Restatement terminology has tended to
"engender confusion").
85. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text (discussing development of the peculiar
risk doctrine in California, and the eventual acceptance of the Restatement formulation of the
doctrine). See, e.g., Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448, 456-57, 334 P.2d 870, 874 (1959)
(adopting the first Restatement formulation); Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 25354, 437 P.2d 508, 513-14, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25-26 (1968) (adopting the Second Restatement
formulation).
86. 24 Cal. 3d 502, 595 P.2d 619, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1979).
87. Aceves, 24 Cal. 3d at 508-510, 595 P.2d at 622-23, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45 (citing
Sections 413, 416, and 426 of Restatement (Second) of Torts).
88. Id. at 509, 595 P.2d at 622, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 44. See also supra notes 59-66 and
accompanying text (discussing the distinction between Second Restatement Sections 413 and
416).
89. Aceves, 24 Cal. 3d at 510, 595 P.2d at 623, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (1979) (citing W.
Prosser, Law of Torts § 71, at 474-75 (4th ed. 1971)). See supra note 79 (providing Prosser's
definition of collateral risk doctrine).
90. See infra notes 85-149 and accompanying text (discussing the varying approaches
taken in applying the peculiar risk doctrine). See also Henderson Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Smiley,
120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 916, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875, 881 (1981) (expressly recognizing that courts
have taken varying approaches to the doctrine).
91. 23 Cal. 3d 578, 591 P.2d 503, 153 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1979).
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tractor was injured when the unsloped and unsupported walls of a
pipeline excavation caved in on top of him. 92 The defendant, Dart
Industries, had hired the independent contractor to perform the
excavation and pipeline work. 93 The issue before the court was

whether the trenching work involved a peculiar risk of physical harm
to the workers of the independent contractor. 94 In attempting to
define the scope and parameters of the peculiar risk doctrine, the

court reviewed the facts of previous peculiar risk cases. 95 Based

primarily upon this listing of cases, the court held that the risk of a
cave-in would be a peculiar risk if the jury found that the employer
could have foreseen the danger. 96 Since the court did not provide
clear guidance on the application of the doctrine, lower courts have
applied the case review method to define and illustrate the scope of
the peculiar risk doctrine. 97

The most notable application of the Griesel case review method
was in Stark v. Weeks Real Estate.98 In Stark, an employee of an

independent contractor was injured by an electric hand saw that the
contractor had allowed to be modified so that the shield covering

the blade was inoperative. 99 The injured worker apparently argued

that the presence of an improperly modified hand saw on the work

site created a risk that was within the scope of the peculiar risk
doctrine. As a result, the employer of the independent contractor

92. Griesel, 23 Cal. 3d at 582, 591 P.2d at 504-505, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15.
93. Id. at 581, 591 P.2d at 504, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
94. Id. at 585-86, 591 P.2d at 507, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 215-16. On appeal the plaintiff
successfully challenged the trial court's binding instruction to the jury that the peculiar risk
doctrine was not applicable. The trial judge specifically instructed the jury that the risks
involved in trenching work are "ordinary and customary," and accordingly, no peculiar risk
was present in the work. Id.
95. Id. at 586, 591 P.2d at 507-8, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 217. The final case reviewed by the
court was factually similar to the Griesel case. See Widman v. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc., 19
Cal. App. 3d 734, 97 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1971) (holding that the risk of a cave-in while working
in a 14-foot deep trench was a peculiar risk).
96. Griesel, 23 Cal. 3d at 586, 591 P.2d at 508, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
97. See infra note 149 (citing cases which have used the approach of the Griesel court to
analyze the application of the peculiar risk doctrine). The method of defining the scope of
the doctrine through examples from previous decisions is utilized to a degree in virtually every
reported decision on the peculiar risk doctrine. In most instances, the court will first note that
the definition of the doctrine is "elusive." The court then cites a string of cases, providing a
parenthetical summary of the facts. In this manner, the outer parameters of the doctrine are
said to be "defined." See, e.g., Stark v. Weeks Real Estate, 94 Cal. App. 3d 965, 970-71,
156 Cal. Rptr. 701, 704 (1979); Hughes v. Atlantic Pac. Const. Co., 194 Cal. App. 3d 987,
998 n.4, 240 Cal. Rptr. 200, 206 n.4 (1987).
98. 94 Cal. App. 3d 965, 156 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1979).
99. Stark, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 968, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 703.

209

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
should be vicariously liable. '0 In addressing this argument, the court
noted that the "abstract definition" of the peculiar risk doctrine was
"elusive" and that the parameters of the doctrine could best be
determined by example. 10' The opinion then proceeded to review cases
that had found risks within the scope of the doctrine. 0 2 The court
was unable to find a sufficiently analogous case. 0 Thus, the court
held the risk to be outside the scope of the peculiar risk doctrine. °The vague attempt at defining and applying the peculiar risk doctrine
illustrated by both Griesel and Stark is utilized to some degree by
virtually all the courts in considering the application of the peculiar
risk doctrine. 05
The second approach taken by the courts of appeal in applying
the peculiar risk doctrine is found in the case of Henderson Brothers
Stores, Inc. v. Smiley. °6 In Henderson Brothers, a tar kettle being
used by an independent contractor hired to reroof Smiley's building
overheated and exploded. The explosion set fire to the adjacent
Henderson Brothers' building and caused substantial damage. 0 7 Henderson Brothers argued that the use of a tar kettle heated to temperatures over 450 degrees created a peculiar risk of harm that
necessitated special precautions. As a result, the employer should be
liable through the application of the peculiar risk doctrine. 0 8 In
considering this argument, the court expressly acknowledged that
other courts had taken varied approaches to the peculiar risk issue. 0 9
The court then listed four factors drawn from previous decisions to
determine whether the risk was within the scope of the doctrine." 0
100. Id. The case is an appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment in
favor of the employer. The only issue considered on appeal was the applicability of the peculiar
risk doctrine. Id.
101. Id. at 970-71, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 972, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
104. Id. at 972-73, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 705-06. This holding was based partially on the fact
that the risk was not one which the employer could reasonably anticipate. In addition, the
court concluded that the risk was within the definition of collateral risk. Id.
105. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the Griesel
decision).
106. 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1981).
107. Henderson Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 908, 174 Cal. Rptr.
875, 877 (1981).
108. Id. at 909, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
109. Id. at 916, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 881. The Henderson Bros. court included a list of cases
in the opinion that found peculiar risks in the contract work. Id. at 911 n.3, 174 Cal. Rptr.
at 878 n.3 (citing Stark v. Weeks Real Estate, 94 Cal. App. 3d 965, 970-71, 156 Cal. Rptr.
701, 704 (1987)). This list, however, was relegated to a footnote and was not considered in
the final analysis. Id.
110. Id. at 916-17, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 881-82. These factors include the foreseeability of the
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This multi-factor approach appears to include prima facie elements

that significantly narrow the application of the peculiar risk doctrine.
The first two factors listed by the court contain the three prima

facia elements of the peculiar risk doctrine recognized ih the second
Restatement definitions."' The first factor requires that the risk that

caused the injury be foreseeable to the employer.

2

The second factor

requires the risk to be inherent in, or arise out of, the work."

3

In

addition, any such inherent risk must not arise solely in the perform4
ance of operative details of the work."
The third factor articulated by the Henderson Brothers court

represents a substantial departure from the language in the Restatement. The third factor requires that the court consider the degree of
the risk that caused the injury. The court cited West v. Guy F.
Atkinson Const. Co. as authority for the degree-of-risk factor.'' In
West, the court relied upon a treatise by Prosser which argued that

the peculiar risk doctrine seems to be limited either to cases of high
risk work or cases in which the work has a specific recognizable

risk." 6 This is contrary to the second Restatement. Both comment b
to second Restatement section 413 and comment c to section 427
expressly state that application of the peculiar risk doctrine is not
7
limited to work that involves a high degree of risk."1

The California Supreme Court has refused to limit the peculiar
risk doctrine to work involving a high degree of risk."18 Under Aceves,
risk, whether the risk is inherent in the work or merely an accident in the operative details of
the work, the degree of the risk, and the availability of definite precautions that could have
averted the danger. Id.
111. Id. The first two factors listed by the court are (1) the foreseeability of the risk, and
(2) whether the risk is intimately connected with the work, or is accidental. Id. The three
prima facie elements of the peculiar risk doctrine are that the risk be (1) inherent in the work
which the independent contractor was hired to perform, (2) beyond the common and ordinary
risks involved in that work, and (3) foreseeable by the employer. See supra notes 10-13 and
accompanying text (discussing the prima facia elements of the peculiar risk doctrine).
112. Henderson Bros., 120 Cal. App. 3d at 916-17, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 881-82.
113. Id.
114. Id. This requirement distinguishes between special or peculiar risks, and mere common
or ordinary risks not intended to fall within the scope of the peculiar risk doctrine. For policy
reasons the peculiar risk doctrine does not impose liability when the risk that gives rise to the
injury is so common or ordinary that it is reasonable to allow the employer to assume that
the independent contractor will take ordinary precautions to protect against the risk. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 comment b (1965).
115. Henderson Bros., 120 Cal. App. 3d at 917, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (citing West v. Guy
F. Atkinson Const. Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 296, 59 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1967)).
116. West, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 299, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 288 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS 486 (3d ed. 1964)). See also PROSSER, supra note 3 § 71, at 514 (5th
ed. 1984).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413 comment b, 427 comment c (1965).
118. Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 509, 595 P.2d 619, 622, 156 Cal.
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if the requisite elements of the doctrine are satisfied, the doctrine is
applied regardless of the degree of risk involved." 9 The potential
impact of a degree of risk factor would be to narrow the scope of
the doctrine substantially. In addition to reducing the scope of the
doctrine, the inclusion of a degree-of-risk factor would add an
additional layer of analysis. The courts and juries would be required
to answer the added question of what risks are sufficiently great to
justify imposing liability. The inclusion of a degree-of-risk factor by
the Henderson Brothers court thus is inconsistent with California's
20
statement of the peculiar risk doctrine.
The final factor cited by the Henderson Brothers court concerns
the availability of definite special precautions to avert the danger.'
In support of this factor, the court cited Addison v. Susanville
Lumber, Inc.'22 In Addison, an independent contractor was retained
to clear a logging road through a rural forest.'- An employee of the
independent contractor' 24 was injured by a tree which was cut down
incorrectly. 25 The Addison court concluded that the risk of an
independent contractor hiring an incompetent employee was too
common to trigger the peculiar risk .doctrine. 26 According to the
court, an employer need not anticipate the need for special precautions against such common risks. 27 After announcing this decision,
the court added that they found it "hard to conceive of any special
precautions one could take in a rural forest to eliminate such a
common risk.' ' 28 The Henderson Brothers court relied upon this
specific language in articulating a factor which requires the availa29
bility of special precautions which could have prevented the harm.
Rptr. 41, 44 (citing RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 comment b, as indicating that the
degree of risk is not relevant to the application of the peculiar risk doctrine).
119. Id.
120. RTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 comment b (1965).
121. Henderson Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 917, 174 Cal. Rptr.
875, 882 (1981).
122. Id. (citing Addison v. Susanville Lumber, 47 Cal. App. 3d 394, 402, 120 Cal. Rptr.
737, 742 (1975)).
123. Addison v. Susanville Lumber, 47 Cal. App. 3d 394, 397, 120 Cal. Rptr. 737, 73839 (1975).
124. The peculiar risk doctrine also applies when plaintiff is an employee of the independent
contractor. See generally Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 509 n.1, 595
P.2d 619, 622 n.1, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44 n.1 (1979); Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d
245, 254, 437 P.2d 508, 514, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20, 26 (1968).
125. Addison, 47 Cal. App. 3d at 397, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 738-39.
126. Id. at 401-2, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
127. Id. at 402, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
128. Id.
129. Henderson Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 917, 174 Cal. Rptr.
875, 882 (1982).
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By including factors concerning the degree of risk created by the
activity and the availability of special precautions to prevent harm,

the Henderson Brothers court adds several substantive prerequisites
to the application of the peculiar risk doctrine. Thus, the burden on

a plaintiff who is attempting to impose liability on an employer of
a negligent independent contractor is increased. No other court of
appeal has yet adopted the approach articulated by the Henderson
30
Brothers court.
The final approach taken by the California courts in applying the

peculiar risk doctrine was articulated in Jimenez v. Pacific Western
Construction Company, Inc.'3' The facts of Jimenez are indistinguishable from the facts of Griesel v. Dart Industries 3 2 In Jimenez,
two employees of the independent contractor were working in an
unsupported and unsloped nine foot deep trench when the walls
collapsed on top of them. 33 One worker was killed, the other was
seriously injured.3 -14 The Jimenez court divided the peculiar risk

analysis into two prongs. Under the first prong the court considers
whether the contract work was likely to create a peculiar risk of
harm absent special precautions.' 35 The second prong limits the
36
doctrine to peculiar risks that the employer should have foreseen.

The Jimenez decision did not analyze the first prong of this
approach. Rather, the court was bound by the prior holding of
Griesel that contract work involving the excavation of a deep trench
37
presents a peculiar risk of harm absent special precaution.

130. See generally Caudel v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 165 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9 n.5, 211
Cal. Rptr. 222, 227 n.5 (1985) (discussing) to Henderson Brothers as an example of a fact
situation in which no collateral negligence was found).
131. 185 Cal. App. 3d 102, 229 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1986).
132. Jimenez, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 110, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 578-79 (1986). See Griesel v.
Dart Industries, Inc., 23 Cal. 3d 578, 582, 591 P.2d 503, 504-05, 15 Cal. Rptr. 213, 214 (1979)
(holding that working in an unsloped and unsupported nine foot deep trench presents a peculiar
risk of harm absent special precautions). See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text
(discussing Griesel).
133. Jimenez, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 107-08, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 110, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 110, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 578-9.
The Jimenez approach was recently followed in Hughes v. Atlantic Pacific Const. Co., 194
Cal. App. 3d 987, 998, 240 Cal. Rptr. 200, 206 (1987). Hughes arose when an employee of
an independent contractor, hired to pour concrete during construction of a high-rise building,
fell into a gap in the floor of the fifth story. Id. at 992-93, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 202. The twofoot "seismic joint" was placed in the floor to allow the separate towers of the building to
sway independently in the event of an earthquake. The plaintiff's fall occurred when a bridge
over the gap collapsed. Id. In affirming the trial court's granting of a motion for nonsuit in
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The second prong of the Jimenez approach focuses on whether
the employer should foresee that the work is likely to create the
peculiar risk.'38 The employer in Jimenez argued that this foreseeability analysis requires consideration of the knowledge and experience
of the employer in the type of work being performed by the independent contractor. 39 The court agreed that this analysis was correct
in cases containing no evidence that the employer had actually
anticipated the risk.' 4° In this case, however, the evidence indicated
that the employer had in fact anticipated the risk.' 4' The court ruled
that when the employer has actually foreseen the peculiar risk, the
knowledge and experience of the employer in the type of work being
42
performed by the independent contractor becomes irrelevant.
The approach taken by the court in Jimenez provides a clear
presentation of the three prima facie elements of the peculiar risk
4
doctrine which are reflected in the second Restatement definition. 1
The first prong requires both that the risk be inherent in the work,
and that the risk be peculiar, or beyond the common or ordinary
risks of the work.' 44 The second prong requires that the risk be
foreseeable to a reasonable person in the position of the employer. 45
The Jimenez decision, however, was unable to provide a full analysis
of the first prong of this approach.

favor of the general contractor, the Hughes court entered into a detailed factual analysis of
the first prong of the analysis articulated in Jimenez. The court noted that the evidence at
trial showed that the cause of the collapse of the bridge was the use of a piece of plywood
that was too small. Id. at 993, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 203. The court held as a matter of law that
the risk of an independent contractor using an improperly sized piece of wood was not a
peculiar risk inherent in the work of building a high-rise. Id. at 999, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
The court did not expressly divide the analysis of the first prong of the Jimenez approach
into two factors. Nevertheless, the conclusion that the risk must be both inherent in the work,
and peculiar or special is implicit in the language of the court's holding. Id. The only criticism
that might be made of the Hughes decision is that the holding appears to withdraw somewhat
from the rule that peculiar risk issues are ordinarily left to the trier of fact.
138. Jimenez, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 110, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 579. The second prong of the
Jimenez approach is simply an analysis of the foreseeability of the risk.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 110-11, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
141. Id. In ruling that the employer had actually foreseen the presence of a peculiar risk,
the court noted the testimony of the president of the defendant construction company. The
president testified that he was aware that a permit was needed to perform the trenching work,
and that he requested that the independent contractor obtain one. Id. In addition, both the
president and the construction company's project foreman knew of the applicable safety
standards concerning trenching. Id.
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (discussing the prima facia elements of
the peculiar risk doctrine).
144. Jimenez, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 110, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
145. Id.
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The approaches the California appellate courts have taken to the

peculiar risk doctrine represent distinct and differing attempts to
provide a workable definition and application of the doctrine. For

example, the approach taken by the Jimenez court differs noticeably
from the Henderson Brothers multi-factor analysis. The Henderson

Brothers court required that the plaintiff prove there were available
special precautions, and the risk of harm was significant.1 46 The
Jimenez court did not require such proof.' 47 In addition to these two

approaches, the case analysis method stated in Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc.'48 continues to be utilized by courts attempting to

articulate a workable
these three divergent
risk doctrine strongly
definition and correct
V.

definition of the doctrine. 49 The presence of
approaches to the application of the peculiar
suggests a need for clarification of both the
application of the rule.

PROPOSAL FOR THE CLARIFICATION

OF THE PECULIAR RISK DOCTRINE IN CALIFORNIA

The confusion surrounding the peculiar risk doctrine is clearly
evidenced by the varying approaches taken in applying the doctrine

in California.

50

In addition, the second Restatement of Torts does

not provide a clear definition to dispel
second Restatement promulgated four
peculiar risk doctrine, all of which have
by the California courts. Thus, there

this confusion. Rather, the
redundant sections of the
been utilized to some degree
is a need for clarification.

Ideally, clarification of the peculiar risk doctrine should incorporate

146. See Henderson Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Smiley, 120 Cal. App. 3d 903, 916-17, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 875, 881-82 (1981). See supra notes 106-130 and accompanying text (discussing Henderson
Brothers v. Smiley).
147. See Jimenez v. Pacific W. Const. Co., 185 Cal. App. 3d 102, 229 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1986). No reported cases have followed the Henderson Brothers approach. Thus it cannot be
determined whether the additional requirements articulated in that approach might produce
results that would differ from an analysis under Jimenez.
148. 23 Cal. 3d 578, 591 P.2d 503, 153 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1979). See supra notes 91-97 and
accompanying text (discussing GrieseO.
The Griesel decision gave rise to an analysis that attempts to illuminate the contours and
application of the doctrine by providing numerous examples of how the doctrine has previously
been applied.
149. See, e.g., Stark v. Weeks Real Estate, 94 Cal. App. 3d 965, 156 Cal. Rptr. 701
(1979); Hughs v. Atlantic Pac. Const. Co., 194 Cal. App. 3d 987, 240 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1987).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 85-149 (discussing the varying approaches taken
to the application and definition of the peculiar risk doctrine).
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the prima facia elements of the doctrine' 5 1 into a statement of the
rule that also suggests the appropriate application. The structure of

the approach taken by the Jimenez court satisfies this objective. The
definition of the doctrine in Jimenez provides for a two-pronged
approach. Under the first prong the court determines whether the
work presents a peculiar risk of harm absent special precautions. The
second prong requires analysis of whether the risk identified under
the first prong is one that the employer could have reasonably
foreseen. The approach taken by the Jimenez court encompasses the
core of the doctrine, but further analysis is needed to fully develop
the approach.
The first prong of the Jimenez approach defines whether the risk
is in fact a peculiar risk. The focus of this prong is on the nature
of the risk that precipitated the injury to the plaintiff. To define the
nature of the risk two factors should be evaluated. First, the risk
must be inherent in the work. Second, the risk must be special or
peculiar, or beyond the common and ordinary risks associated with
15 2
the work.
In order to satisfy the first factor, that the risk be inherent in the
work, the risk must arise either out of the character of the work or
the location in which the work is to be performed.' 53 The key to this
analysis is whether the risk is one that can be severed from the work
site. If the negligence that caused the plaintiff's injury could have
occurred outside the context of the job, then the risk is not inherent
in the work. As a result, the peculiar risk doctrine will not apply. 54

151. The prima facie elements of the peculiar risk doctrine, that preexisted the Restatement
formulation, are relatively simple. The doctrine is triggered by the presence of a risk which
meets three criteria. First, the risk must be inherent in the contract work. Second, the risk
must be sufficiently peculiar to require the taking of special precautions. That is, the risk must
be beyond the common and ordinary risks that require merely routine precautions. Finally,
the risk must be one that the employer did foresee or should have foreseen. See supra notes
10-50 and accompanying text (introducing the peculiar risk doctrine and its origins).
152. See generally PROSSER, supra note 3 § 71, at 509; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 413 comment b (1965).
153.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 comment b (1965).

154. Compare Stark v. Weeks Real Estate, 94 Cal. App. 3d 965, 156 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1979)
(the dangerous element/risk in Stark was the presence of a power saw that had a disabled
safety guard. Removal of the saw from the work site severs the risk from the work, thus it
becomes clear that the risk is not inherent in the work, and the peculiar risk doctrine does
not apply) with Griesel v. Dart Indus., Inc., 23 Cal. 3d 578, 591 P.2d 503, 153 Cal. Rptr.
213 (1979) (the work required the presence of a deep trench in which people would be working.
The risk/danger is that the walls of the trench might collapse on the workers. This risk cannot
be removed from the nature of the work. Thus, special precautions are required [shoring or
sloping the walls] and the peculiar risk doctrine is applicable).
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The second factor in defining the nature of the risk requires that
the risk present a special, peculiar or unusual danger. This factor
excludes risks that are common or ordinary. Distinguishing between
peculiar and common risks is the central consideration in applying
the peculiar risk doctrine. 55 This determination is based on a factual
analysis of the circumstances surrounding the work that is being
performed by the independent contractor. 56 This question ordinarily
must be resolved by the trier of fact. 5 7 If analysis of the first prong
of the proposed approach reveals a peculiar risk inherent in the
contract work, the second prong must then be analyzed.
The second prong of the Jimenez approach focuses on whether
the risk was foreseeable to the employer. 5 8 The peculiar risk identified
under the first prong must be one that the employer could have
foreseen. If the employer actually recognized the risk, the second
inquiry is satisfied and the employer is held liable. 59 Absent actual

recognition of the risk, the employer may nonetheless be held liable
if the employer was in a position to have constructive knowledge of
the risk. In such situations the employer's knowledge and experience

in the area of work being contracted becomes relevant. 60 The greater
the employer's knowledge and experience, the more likely the em-

ployer will be held to have constructive knowledge of the peculiar
6
risks arising out of the work.' '

155. Consequently, making this distinction has led courts to differing approaches to the
doctrine. Sections 413 and 416 of the second Restatement of Torts have framed this concept
by reference to "special precautions." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413, 416
(1965). When the risk presented would cause a reasonable person to believe that special
precautions are warranted, the risk will be deemed peculiar. Id. Section 427, on the other
hand, defines peculiar risks as "special dangers" of physical harm recognizable in advance.
Id. § 427. Thus, the central concern of the doctrine can be stated in several ways.
156. See id. § 413 comment b (1965). An example that is commonly used to distinguish
between common risks and peculiar risks is the risk that a contractor will be negligent in
operating a vehicle while performing the contract work. This form of risk is considered
cotnon and ordinary, and requiring only routine precautions. Thus, this form of risk is
ex-luded from the scope of the doctrine. Id.
157. Mackey v. Campbell Const. Co., 101 Cal. App. 3d 774, 785, 162 Cal. Rptr. 64, 69
(1930).
1:'8. Jimenez v. Pacific W. Const. Co., Inc., 185 Cal. App. 3d 102, 110, 229 Cal. Rptr.
575. 578 (1986).
159 See, e.g., Jimenez v. Pacific W. Const. Co., 185 Cal. App. 3d 102, 229 Cal. Rptr.
57' (1986). The court in Jimenez found evidence that the employer actually foresaw the
peculiar risk. Thus there was no inquiry into the employers constructive knowledge. Id. at
I11, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 comment f (1965). The comment provides
the example of a widow who has hired a building contractor to construct a home. The widow
will be held to a lesser standard of foreseeability than will a real estate developer who hires
the same contractor to build the same home. Id.
161. Jimenez, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 111, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
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In summary, the following analytical approach is proposed:
I. Does the work present a peculiar risk of harm absent special
precautions?
(I) Is the risk inherent in the work, or is the risk severable from
the context of the work; and

(2) Is the risk special, peculiar or unusual, or is the risk so common
that a reasonable person in the employer's position would not
consider special precautions warranted?
II. Was the risk one that was or should have been foreseen by
the employer as arising out of the work?
This proposed analytical approach adopts and modifies the tests
stated in the Jimenez decision. This approach to the peculiar risk

doctrine will provide structure both for practitioners concerned with
pleading and proof, and for courts faced with issues under the

peculiar risk doctrine.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The peculiar risk doctrine is an exception to the general rule of

nonliability for the torts of independent contractors. The doctrine is
frequently relied upon to impose liability on employers who have,
through their work, created identifiable risks of harm to others. The

peculiar risk doctrine is based on sound policy demanding that
liability for torts rest with those parties who are responsible for

creating the risks.
To implement the peculiar risk doctrine, California has relied upon
the definition of the doctrine in the second Restatement of Torts.

Unfortunately, the second Restatement has promulgated several redundant definitions that have obscured the relatively simple contours

of the doctrine. 162 If the courts are to provide the needed clarification

162.

The Restatement has codified three affirmative statements of the doctrine. See REOF TORTS §§ 413, 416, and 427 (1965). California has expressly adopted
two of these sections, 413 and 416. See Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502,
508, 595 P.2d 619, 621, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43-44 (1979). The third section, 427, has been
referred to as an additional correct statement of the doctrine. See Caudel v. East Bay Mun.
Util. Dist., 165 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6, 211 Cal. Rptr. 222, 224-25 (1985). While the courts have
made distinctions between these sections, the sections have been applied interchangeably. In
addition, California has recognized a fourth section in the Restatement, section 426, that
codifies the collateral risk doctrine. See Aceves, 24 Cal. 3d at 510, 595 P.2d at 623, 156 Cal.
Rptr. at 45. The collateral risk doctrine merely defines risks that are not included within the
scope of the peculiar risk doctrine. In this sense, § 426 is redundant. See supra notes 51-84
and accompanying text (discussing the above Restatement sections).
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